ABSTRACT A distributed temporal and spatial aggregation scheme for privacy-preserving smart metering is presented. This scheme preserves the privacy of fine-grained utility usage data of individual users while reporting: 1) spatially aggregated utility usage data of a community at fine-grained time steps (e.g., minutes) and 2) temporally aggregated utility usage data of individual users to the utility company over a billing period (e.g., a month). Each meter privately partitions the fine-grained utility data into k partitions and sends them to (homomorphically encrypted) k − 1 pairwise smart meters in the community, while keeping the remaining for itself. A smart meter will report to the aggregator, a locally aggregated usage amount of its own and of all its pairwise nodes at the fine-grained time scale allowing community-wide spatial aggregation at the aggregator without revealing individual fine-grained usage data. A smart meter will temporally aggregate usage data from each of its pairwise nodes and transmit it to the aggregator where the overall temporal aggregation will be performed by each smart meter. Our scheme not only can prevent privacy theft from external attackers but also is resilient to internal attacks by a subset of smart meters or even colluding gateway aggregator and the control center. This is a distinct advantage of our scheme over existing works without incurring any computation and communication overheads.
I. INTRODUCTION
Smart meters are programmable utility meters for measuring, reporting, and controlling utility power flow to individual users. They are connected to a communication infrastructure to facilitate remote query and control by authorized parties. Smart meters play a crucial role in a Smart Grid infrastructure [1] .
Fine-grained power consumption data aggregated over a community facilitates accurate short-term demand forecasting and efficient operation of the smart grid by utility suppliers [2] . Such information can only be afforded using smart meters and associated household area networks (HAN). However, these automated data aggregation efforts also bring heightened privacy and security concerns [3] , [4] . For example, fine-grained utility consumption data may reveal the owner's daily routines or even the house occupancy
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Zhenliang Zhang. information interested by would-be burglars [5] . It is worth noting that in 14 threat types defined by the Electronic Privacy Information Center, the determination of personal behavior profiles are the second most serious privacy consequence of smart grid systems [6] .
Homomorphic encryption aggregation [7] - [17] is a data aggregation approach that allows numerical manipulation of encrypted data without decryption. Thus, the confidentiality and integrity of individual usage data can be protected during the process of aggregation. Existing smart meter privacy protection schemes [8] , [11] - [13] , [16] use homomorphic encryption to protect the privacy of individual user data against a semi-trustable aggregator which may attempt to uncover individual user's fine-grained utility data. However, there are no discussions on fending off potential privacy attacks through multiple-user collusion, or user-aggregator collusion.
In this work, we propose a novel distributed random homomorphic encryption scheme to protect the fine-grained power consumption data at the individual Household Smart Meter (HSM, user). The privacy protection will be enforced for (a) the community-wide spatial data aggregation at a finegrained time scale in the range of minutes, and (b) individual users temporal data aggregation over a billing cycle (e.g. a month). We will show that the proposed scheme is resilient to four broad privacy/security attack scenarios.
Central to this proposed distributed data aggregation scheme is to divide each user's fine-grained smart meter reading into k partitions. Each partition will be homomorphically encrypted and transmitted to one of (k − 1) pairwise users in the community (the same HAN network). Thus, each user within the HAN may also receive multiple readings from its own pair-wise users. A user then will aggregate all received encrypted data including the reserved partition of its own encrypted data and transmit the result in the homomorphically encrypted form to an aggregation gateway. The aggregation gateway will add these partially aggregated data, where the spatial aggregation of all users will be performed in the homomorphically encrypted format. The result then will be submitted to the control center for power consumption prediction and planning. Such spatial aggregation will be performed frequently, say every 15 minutes at a fine-granularity time scale.
At the end of a billing cycle (e.g. a month), each user will aggregate temporal usage data for each of its pairwise neighbors over the period and submit the homomorphically encrypted aggregation data to the aggregator gateway with user identity tags. At the gateway, the aggregator will sort the user identity tag and perform temporal aggregation of individual users' utility data over the entire billing cycle. The monthly utility data for each user then will be submitted to the control center in an encrypted format.
This proposed scheme can protect the privacy of individual users' fine-grained utility usage data even under the joint attack by the control center and the gateway aggregator. This is accomplished without incurring additional computation and communication overheads. This is a distinct and important advantage over existing works [7] , [10] , [11] , [18] , [22] - [24] . Furthermore, rigorous mathematical proof of the power of privacy protection under various attack scenarios is provided. This theoretical analysis is both new and significant for establishing resilient of the proposed method.
The rest of this paper are organized as follows: In section II, related works are reviewed. In section III, the Paillier cryptosystem is introduced, and the system, data, as well as attack models are presented. In section IV, the smart meter data aggregation problems are formulated. A novel distributed fine-grained spatial aggregation and a coarse-grained temporal aggregation scheme are proposed. This is followed by detailed privacy and security analysis. In section V, the communication and computation overheads are discussed. The conclusion is presented in section VI.
II. RELATED WORKS
Privacy-preserving metering aggregation techniques have been discussed in [7] , [8] , [10] - [13] , and [17] - [24] . A comparison of several most relevant works with the work presented in this paper is reported in Table 1 .
Depending on the role of attackers, the privacy and security of smart grids may be attacked by external attackers such as malicious hackers or internal attackers such as deceiving users or dishonest data aggregators. In table 1, all protocols except [7] and [24] claimed to be able to deal with both external (E) and internal (I) attacks. External attackers gain access to the private fine-grained utility data through eavesdropping of the communication channel. Using trusted communication channels [7] , [11] , [22] - [24] , or security measures such as signature and verification [10] , [18] would be an effective defense to external attacks via eavesdropping. In this work, we assume the authentication of senders and receivers within the same HAN network and between a user and the aggregator can be accomplished securely. There is no additional measure needed to secure data transmission. VOLUME 7, 2019 As shown in Table 1 , the aggregation method adopted in this work, as well as that used in [7] , is Paillier homomorphic encryption and modular addition. The Paillier encryption is also adopted in [22] and [23] . In [18] , a privacyenhanced data aggregation scheme using bi-linear pairing and Diffie-Hellman encryption is proposed. He et al. [10] proposed a privacy-preserving data aggregation scheme using the BGN (Boneh, Goh, and Nissim) homomorphic encryption and authentication. Jia et al. [24] assume a trusted aggregator that uses the private key of each user to decrypt the transmitted aggregation data. The fine-grained meter readings of each user will be divided into k partitions and encode each partition as the coefficients of a high-order polynomial. The values of the polynomial at different points are used as the transmitted data. The aggregator needs to evaluate the coefficients of the polynomial and use the user's private key to decrypt the data. The computation overhead is rather large. Besides [24] , all other protocols, including ours in Table 1 only assume the aggregator to be semi-trusted. In other words, the aggregator may want to expose individual users' fine-grained utility usage data and violate the user's privacy.
In-Network aggregation means the aggregation happens with the participation of smart meters [17] . As shown in Table 1 , all protocols including the scheme proposed in this paper incorporate in-network aggregation except [10] and [18] .
In Table 1 , the column title ''Keys'' refers to the number of private keys that need to be exchanged between each SM and its neighboring SMs. The same as [11] , [22] , and [24] , our proposed method requires O(K ) key exchanges and K (< N ) is the neighbors receiving partitions from each SM.
Among these related works, we would like to specifically comment on [7] , [22] , and [23] .
Garcia and Jacobs [7] adopted the Paillier encryption and modular addition to facilitate spatial aggregation. While this method is shown to be privacy-preserving, it requires O(N 2 ) data transmissions for each aggregation pass [22] .
Erkin and Tsudik [23] proposed an encryption scheme such that ''each smart meter encrypts its fine-grained power consumption measurement. However, no one can decrypt this individual encryption. Decryption only becomes possible when a fixed, predefined number of encryptions is aggregated.''. Dimitriou and Awad [22] observed that (this) ''technique works only for the honest-but-curious model and requires a substantial amount of interaction among meters''. Dimitriou and Awad [22] proposed a public-key based protocol and considers the malicious adversarial model. The protocol is decentralized and does not rely on a trusted third party to operate. They claim O(K ) work and memory overhead where K is a fixed number independent of the total number of smart meters N .
III. PRELIMINARIES
We summarize the notations used in the paper in Table 2 . 
A. PAILLIER CRYPTOSYSTEM
The Paillier cryptosystem includes three algorithms: key generation, encryption, and decryption [9] .
1) KEY GENERATION:
Choose two large random numbers p, q of equal length, i.e. |p| = |q| = κ, such that gcd(pq, (p−1)(q−1)) = 1. Compute the RSA modulus n = pq and λ = lcm (p − 1, q − 1). Here gcd is the greatest common divisor, and lcm is the least common multiplier. Next, select a random integer generator g ∈ Z * n 2 and set
Here L(u) is the integer quotient of (u−1)/n. Finally, the public key (for encryption) PK = (n, g) and the corresponding private key (for decryption) SK = (λ, α).
2) ENCRYPTION:
Given a message m ∈ Z n and select a random number r ∈ Z * n 2 , the ciphertext
(1) 
3) DECRYPTION:
Given the ciphertext c ∈ Z * n 2 , compute the plaintext message as
4) HOMOMORPHIC PROPERTIES:
For random Numbers m 1 , m 2 , r 1 , and r 2 , the following properties hold:
B. SYSTEM MODEL
The system model considered in this work is shown in Fig.1 . Originally proposed by the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), this model has been adopted in [8] , [10] , [14] , [16] , [18] , and [24] . It consists of power plants, a Control Center (CC), several Building Area Networks (BAN). Each BAN consists of a gateway (GW) and N house-holding smart meters (HSMs, users) inter-connected via wireless channels forming a house-holding Area Network (HAN). The power will flow from the power plant via the transmission lines and distribution networks to individual users. Two types of meter readings will be reported by HSMs to the CC: (a) a community-wide, spatially aggregated power usage data at a fine-grained time scale (e.g. 15 minutes); and (b) an individual user's temporally aggregated (e.g. monthly) power usage data to facilitate accurate utility billing.
where N is the number of users (HSMs) in a BAN, and T is the billing period when a temporal aggregation is required. At each finegrained time index d, a community-wide (over the entire BAN) spatially aggregated utility usage can be expressed as
At the end of a billing period (d = T ), a temporally aggregated utility usage data for the i th user is expressed as:
These aggregated utility usage data will be evaluated at the GW in the system model before reported to the CC.
D. ATTACK MODEL AND SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
During the process of data reporting, security and privacy concerns must be addressed. Within the system model, there are four types of actors involved in the meter data reporting process: the i th user (self), other users in the same community (BAN), the gateway (GW), and the control center (CC). The CC requires the spatially aggregated finegrained community usage data to optimize power delivery efficiency and the temporally aggregated user-specific utility usage data for the billing purpose. Hence, we stipulate the following security/privacy requirements: Requirement R1. Fine-grained, individual utility data x i d is private and secured. It should not be disclosed to CC, GW, or other users.
Requirement R2. Temporally aggregated, individual utility data x TA (i) is private and secured. It is private because only the i th user and the CC may know the quantity. Neither the GW or any other users in the same community should know its value. It is secured because its value should not be altered during the reporting process without being detected by both the CC and the i th user. VOLUME 7, 2019 Requirement R3. Spatially aggregated, fine-grained time scale community utility usage data x SA (d) is private for GW. Its value may be shared by all users in the same BAN and the CC but not the GW.
An attack is an arrangement that enables unauthorized parties to gain access to private data or to alter secured data without being detected. In this work, we assume the HSMs are tamper-resistant [7] , [22] , [23] and hence x i d is always accurately measured.
Different compositions of the attackers and actions may be grouped into the following attack scenarios (AS):
Attack Scenario 1 (AS1): The control center (CC) may collude with the gateway (GW) to uncover one or more users' fine-grained usage data, violating R1.
Attack Scenario 2 (AS2): Up to N −1 users (HSMs) in the community may collude with the CC and GW to uncover the N th user's private fine-grained usage data, and thus violate the privacy requirement R1.
Attack Scenario 3 (AS3): An external attacker or the GW may want to access an individual user's temporally aggregated utility usage data meant for the billing purpose, and hence violate the requirement R2.
Attack Scenario 4 (AS4): The CC may collude with the GW to use user-reported data to estimate an individual user's fine-grained utility data x i d .
IV. PROPOSED SCHEME
In the proposed utility data reporting scheme, the communications between the CC and the GW, and between the GW and each user i will be encrypted using the Paillier cryptosystem. The communications between the i th user and the j th user in the same BAN will be in plaintext.
A. OVERVIEW
During the system initialization phase, the CC will generate a pair of Paillier Cryptosystem's public key PK = (n, g) and corresponding private key SK = (λ, α) for the GW as well as for each user in the BAN. The CC will transmit the PK to each party via the smart grid network and withhold all the private keys to decrypt data transmitted from the GW. During operations, since the Paillier cryptosystem is homomorphic, the GW can perform aggregation operations (additions) using encrypted data submitted by individual users without the need to decrypt the data first. Similarly, the GW will not able to know a user's temporally aggregated billing usage data when relaying this information back to the CC. Hence, using the Paillier encryption between the GW and each user will make the system resilient to attacks AS3 and AS4. The details on using the Paillier cryptosystem at each phase of operations will be discussed later.
B. FINE-GRAINED TIME SCALE SPATIAL AGGREGATION
During each t = d, the i th user in the BAN network will report its fine-grained reading x i d to the GW to facilitate spatial aggregation to CC. However, x i d should not be revealed to the GW or other users to protect the privacy of the i th user.
Let d) ) be the set of pairwise nodes (users, HSMs) of the i th user. Denote k(≤ N ) to be the number of elements in S(i, d). In the proposed spatial aggregation scheme, x i d will be partitioned by the i th user into k parts. k − 1 parts will be transmitted to the j th user where j ∈ S(i, d), and the remaining k th part will be kept by the i th user privately. This can be expressed as
Since every node will distribute this value to its pairwise neighbors, the i th user will also receive partitioned parts from other nodes. This may be expressed as
Note that in Eq. (5), the k th part of x i d is also part of y i d . The communication among users within the BAN will be in the form of plaintext. Its security and privacy implications will be discussed later.
To report the spatially aggregated, fine-grained utility usage data, instead of x i d , the i th user will submit y i d to the GW using the Paillier-encrypted channel. At the GW, the received (and encrypted) E(y i d )(1 ≤ i ≤ N ) will be aggregated (added) together to yield the spatial (and encrypted) aggregation result at time d, E(x SA (d)). Due to the homomorphic property of the Paillier encryption, the GW does not need to decrypt E(y i d ) and there is no need to encrypt the aggregated x SA (d). The i th user's encrypted form is denoted as:
where (g,n) is the public key, n is an RSA modulus, g is a generator of order n and r is a random number in Z * n . For decryption, the reader is referred to [4] and [9] . Theorem 1 below will show that such a distributed spatial aggregation will yield the correct value of x SA (d):
Theorem 1:
Then the sum of all elements in the i th row of X becomes
Now consider the sum of the j th column of the X matrix,
Therefore,
C. COARSE-GRAINED TIME SCALE TEMPORAL AGGREGATION
For convenience, we shall denote the X matrix by X(d) to emphasize its dependence on timestamp d and denote its element as X(i, j, d). Over a billing period T (a coarse-grained time scale), the j th user will add all data received from user i;
That is, user j will compute a local temporal aggregation for user i:
Then, user j will transmit {a LT (i, j);
At the GW, the temporal aggregation will be performed:
D. PRIVACY AND SECURITY ANALYSIS
Privacy and security of the proposed distributed spatial and temporal aggregation protocols will be examined. Specifically, we will examine whether these protocols meet the privacy and security requirements R1, R2, and R3 stated in section III.D.
1) REQUIREMENT R1
The first requirement stipulates that fine-grained, individual utility data {x i d } is private and should not be disclosed to CC, GW, or other users. To verify this requirement is satisfied, we show that the proposed spatial aggregation scheme is resilient to attack scenarios AS1 and AS 2.
First, consider attack AS1 where the CC and GW may collude to decrypt {y i d ; 1 ≤ i ≤ N } into plaintext. In theorem 2, we show that even so, each user's fine-grained utility usage data remains private.
Theorem 2: If {S(i, d); 1 ≤ i ≤ N } contains at least two elements (K ≥ 2), and if there exist (i, j) such that
Proof: Note that equations (4) and (5) may be rewritten in the matrix format since (1 is an N × 1 vector of all 1s):
In general, if X is not a symmetric matrix, and is unknown, given X T · 1 = y d , it is unlikely that X · 1 = x d can be solved. However, there are several exceptions:
Case 2: If X is a symmetric matrix such that
Therefore, even the GW may decrypt the set y i d ; 1 ≤ i ≤ N transmitted by individual users, it is unlikely to uncover the private fine-grained utility usage data of individual users x i d ; 1 ≤ i ≤ N , as long as (a) each pairwise set S(i, d) contains two or more elements, and (b) the corresponding X matrix is not symmetric. (4), one may write
Since the second term is known,
From equation (3), one has
Since the right-hand side is known, {x i d , 1 ≤ i ≤ N } can be computed using the above equation.
Corollary 1 shows the importance of encrypting {y i d ; 1 ≤ i ≤ N } while transmitting them to the GW. Based on the theorem 1 and Eq. (6), the accuracy of the (encrypted) spatial aggregated data can be proved as follows:
Next, consider the attack scenario AS2: A subset of up to N − 1 users may collude with the GW and CC attempting to estimate error of x N N ,d . By keeping x N N ,d reasonably large, the damage due to AS2 can be mitigated.
In summary, the proposed distributed spatial aggregation scheme will be resilient to attack scenarios AS1 and AS2 and hence fulfill the privacy/security requirement R1.
2) REQUIREMENT R2
To validate R2 is satisfied, we examine whether the proposed temporal aggregation scheme is resilient to attack scenario AS3. First, note that a LT (i, j) will be aggregated by individual users privately, and transmitted to the GW homomorphically encrypted. Since the value of interests x TA (i) is distributed over multiple pairwise sets of users and will be aggregated by the GW, therefore, attacking individual user will not be enough to estimate x TA (i). The same homomorphic encryption process also prevents the GW from observing the plaintext value of x TA (i). Therefore, the proposed temporal aggregation scheme is resilient to attack scenario AS3 and meets the requirement R2.
3) REQUIREMENT R3
At the coarse-grained temporal aggregation interval T , the GW will receive {a LT (i, j); 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N } from all N users. These data packets are homomorphically encrypted. However, if the CC colludes with the GW, these data packets will become plain-text. Attack AS4 concerns if individual users' fine-grained utility data x i d may be inferred from {a LT 
To investigate this issue, we define a T × N matrix A(i) such that its element satisfying
Other than the following special cases, it is impossible to compute/estimate x(i) based on a LT (i).
Hence, one should choose T ≥ 2.
Case 2: T ≤ N and S(i, d) = {i}. Then x i d = a LT (i, i).
This again shows the importance to partition the data and transmit parts of the partitions to the neighboring nodes within the BAN.
From the above discussion, it is clear that even when the CC is colluded with the GW to decrypt {a LT (i, j); 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N } into plaintext, they are unable to uncover the finegrained utility data for individual users. Hence the proposed scheme is resilient to attack AS4.
E. AN ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
We give an example in Fig. 2 to provide partitioning details of the proposed algorithm. In this example, we choose N = 4, k = 3, and T = 3. The users are denoted by {U i ; 1 ≤ i ≤ 4}. The pairwise neighboring sets are (for d = 1, 2, 3) , and the specific pairwise nodes and local temporal aggregation are shown in Table 3 and Table 4 :
The plaintext meter readings are shown in Fig.2 , although they need to be homomorphically encrypted in practice. The three tables in the second row of Fig.2 In this example, we set the coarse-grained billing period T = 3. The corresponding A matrix is given in Table 4 .
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed smart meter data aggregation schemes in terms of computation costs of the user (Smart Meters), and the communication overhead between users, and users to the GW. We estimate the computing time of a smart meter using a desktop PC equipped with an AMD processor running at the 750MHz clock frequency, 4GB of RAM and 1MB of flash memory. Each experiment consists of 50 independent trials and the averaged results of these trials are reported. We adopt the Paillier cryptosystem with 512 bits of modulus and at least 1 − 2 −64 certainty of prime generation for homomorphic encryption and decryption. We implement the hash with truncation combined with exclusive-OR, so the computation 28378 VOLUME 7, 2019 overhead of hash is roughly equal to the overhead of addition. The header part of each message has 56 bits. The task for generating the message header is included in calculating the computation and communication overhead. The computation time required for these tasks is listed in Table 5 .
A. COMPUTATION OVERHEAD 1) SPATIAL AGGREGATION
The spatial aggregation computation overhead of the proposed scheme is compared against (i) Erkin and Tsudik's [23] scheme and (ii) Jia et al.'s [24] scheme. The Garcia and Jacobs's [7] scheme consumes an excessively large amount of computation and thus is excluded in this comparison.
In the proposed scheme, at each fine-grained time step d, within the i th smart meter, the following tasks will be performed: (a) to partition the reading 
In Erkin and Tsudik's [23] scheme, at the d th time step, every hash function costs C hash , k masking random keys costs k · C PRF , and computing total masking keys costs 2k · C add , then encrypting individual data costs C enc , so the total computation overhead is
In Jia et al.'s [24] scheme, at the d th time step, additive secret sharing costs C ss , k hash functions costs k · C hash , then k-order polynomial operation x k and k matrix multiplication operations cost (k 2 + 2k) · C mul , so the total computation overhead is
The running time of operations above are listed in Table 6 , and the specific comparison is plotted in Fig.3 . In Table 6 , the assumed computation time for these quantities and the computation overhead formula of these methods are listed. By substituting these values into that formula, in Fig.4 , the computation overhead of each scheme is plotted against the value of k (size of pairwise neighbors) for k varying from 0 to 50 with N = 5000.
Note that Jia et al.'s [24] scheme has advantaged when the value of k is small (no more than 22), since it does not employ public key encryption, however, polynomial operation x k and k matrix multiplication operations generate higher computation overhead with k value growing, it has more cost significantly than ours and Erkin and Tsudik's [23] scheme, although the latter two schemes' overhead also grow slightly. Erkin and Tsudik's [23] scheme is always higher slightly than ours since the former generates hash function for every node at every timestamp, which is slightly higher than low-cost modular addition operation adopted in our scheme.
2) TEMPORAL AGGREGATION
In the proposed temporal aggregation scheme, each node will perform up to k − 1 local aggregation operations and each aggregation may contain up to T transmitted parts from each pairwise neighbor user. Then k locally aggregated results will be encrypted and transmitted to the GW. Thus, the total temporal aggregation computation overhead is
In Erkin and Tsudik's [23] scheme, each node sends T finegrained utility readings in each of the T time steps. so the time cost is (2T −1)·C mul . The scheme adds an additional random key R (i,T +1) to compensate for the lack of synchronization of the spatial-temporal aggregation caused by modifying the encryption method and T ·C mul is the minimum time required for this part.
We set the fine-grained reporting interval to be 15 minutes, and billing period T = 2880 (roughly one month). The computation overheads of our proposed scheme against that of the Erkin and Tsudik's [23] scheme are plotted in Fig. 5 for k ranging from 0 to 50.
From Fig.4 , we can see that the proposed scheme incurs lower cost compared with Erkin and Tsudik's [23] scheme, especially with k value growing, since it encrypts for T times in T serial timestamps, while ours encrypts only once at the T timestamp during the temporal aggregation, and it only needs to do simple additive operation in T timestamps. Besides, ours does not cost extra consumption time on the additional random value R (i,T +1) which costs higher computation overhead, especially when N users all compute it at every T timestamp. 
B. COMMUNICATION OVERHEADS
We assume the format of a packet is the same as that in TinyOS [32] . The timestamp occupies 128 bits. The sizes of prime numbers p, and q needed in the Paillier encryption are 512 bits each. The size of elements in Z * n is 1024 bits. We further assume the packet ID occupies 32 bits, the plaintext data, respectively, the Paillier encryption occupies 4096 bits, while the hash function with timestamp occupies 256 bits.
For simplicity, we denote |ID| , |X | , |R| , |E| , |H | as identity size, plaintext data size, masking random key (noise) size, Paillier encryption size, and the size of hash function random.
1) SPATIAL COMMUNICATION OVERHEAD
In our spatial aggregation, every node sends the local aggregation to the aggregator. The data sent per node can be denoted as In Garcia and Jacobs's [7] scheme, the data packet sent per node during data transmission is in the form as {ID smi ID GW E(X 1 ) E(X 2 ) · · · E(X n−1 ) t}, so the data package size is (2 |ID| + (n − 1) · (|E| + |X | /n) + 128) bits (in the first report phase) and 2 |ID| + |X | + 128 bits (in the second report phase).
In Erkin and Tsudik's [23] scheme, the data packet per node is as the form of {ID smi ID GW E(X ) H R d}, its size is {2 |ID| + |E| + |X | + k · |R| + |H | + 128} bits. In the scheme, R (i,d) is the sum of random keys exchanged between nodes at timestamp d, and it occupies at least k · |R| bytes.
The package size per node above is listed in Table 7 . We plot individual spatial communication overhead of the four schemes in terms of pairwise numbers k and temporal aggregation period T , as shown in the Fig.5 .
From Fig.5 , we can see the spatial communication overhead of the proposed scheme is a constant. The packet size is independent of the value of k. On the other hand, in Erkin and Tsudik's [23] method , spatial overhead is proportional to the value of k. Garcia and Jacobs [7] scheme grows faster with the increasing of k value. When k ≥ 35, the communication overhead of the Jia et al.'s [24] scheme grows the fastest. 
2) TEMPORAL COMMUNICATION OVERHEAD a: INDIVIDUAL COMMUNICATION
At time T , every node in Erkin and Tsudik's [23] scheme sends T data packets in the form of
and
In above, R (i,T +1) is the additive random value provided by the user i satisfying r n T d=1 h
, it is for the synchronization of spatial-temporal aggregation, every node has to generate a R (i,T +1) to valid the decryption at timestamp T [23] . Its size depends on the hash value in the previous T timestamps, so the total data package's size is at least T · (2 |ID| + |E| + |X | + k · |R| + k · |H | + 128) bits.
In our scheme, to generate one node's consumption in T serial timestamps, every pairwise node transmits a packet as the form of {ID smi ID GW E(LT i j ) T } at timestamp T , so the total packet size is at most k · (2 |ID| + |E| + |X | + 128) bits since generating one node's consumption requires k pairs' report cooperatively.
We plot the individual temporal communication overhead comparison of the proposed scheme with Erkin and Tsudik's [23] scheme in terms of k-value in Fig.6 .
From Fig.6 , we can see the overhead in Erkin and Tsudik's [23] scheme is much higher than ours in terms of individual communication overhead. The main difference lies in our scheme depends mainly on k, while Erkin and Tsudik's [23] scheme depends mainly on T , in which one node's temporal aggregation requires its serial T packets, however, ours requires k packets from k pairs at timestamp T . In addition, in our scheme, there is a need for the additive random keys and hash value generation, so it reduces packet size w.r.t. Erkin and Tsudik's [23] scheme.
b: OVERALL TEMPORAL COMMUNICATION OVERHEAD
Assuming that T is 2880, we plot the overall temporal communication overhead of a neighbor with the size of N as shown in Fig.7 , it is shown the overall communication overhead in terms of user number N and pairwise number k. It is shown that our proposed scheme significantly reduces the overall communication overhead in smart grid communication. Above results clearly indicate that the proposed scheme incurs lower computation and communication cost than the referred related schemes in terms of spatial or temporal aggregation and seems to confirm the scalability of our scheme. Note that in all listed protocols as shown in Table 1 , only the proposed scheme and Erkin and Tsudik's [23] scheme address two-dimensional aggregation, so for ease of comparison in terms of spatial-temporal aggregation, we adjusted N representing the total number of meters in the scheme [23] into k denoting the total number of pairwise nodes, so that it is based on the same experimental platform as ours, and doing so reduces its computation and communication overhead, but we still proved that its overhead is higher than ours, even if with this relaxation.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we presented a distributed temporal and spatial aggregation scheme for privacy-preserving smart metering.
The goal is to protect the privacy of fine-grained utility usage data of individual users. We proved that this proposed scheme is resilient to attacks scenarios where even the control center colludes to decrypt the homomorphically encrypted data submitted to the GW. This is a rather unique property compared to existing privacy-preserving smart metering data aggregation schemes. We provide analytical security and privacy analysis, computing and communication overhead analysis and simulations.
